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Abstract
Deep learning image classification is vulnerable to adversarial
attack, even if the attacker changes just a small patch of the
image. We propose a defense against patch attacks based on
partially occluding the image around each candidate patch
location, so that a few occlusions each completely hide the
patch. We demonstrate on CIFAR-10, Fashion MNIST, and
MNIST that our defense provides certified security against
patch attacks of a certain size.
1 Introduction
An attacker with knowledge of a neural network model can
construct, from any normal image x, an adversarial example
x? that looks to humans like x but that the model classifies dif-
ferently from the normal image [SZS+14, GSS15, HJN+11,
CW17].
Recently, researchers have proposed the adversarial patch
attack [BMR+17, KZG18], where the attacker changes just
a limited rectangular region of the image, for example by
placing a sticker over a road sign or other object. Others have
expanded on the vulnerability to this type of attack [EEF+17,
TRG19, XZL+19]. In this paper, we propose a defense against
this attack.
The idea of our defense is to occlude part of the image and
then classify the occluded image. First, we train a classifier
that properly classifies occluded images. Then, if we knew
the location of the adversarial patch, we could occlude that
region of the image (e.g., overwriting it with a uniform grey
rectangle) and apply the classifier to the occluded image. This
would defend against patch attacks, as the attacker’s contribu-
tion is completely overwritten and the input to the classifier
(the occluded image) cannot be affected by the attacker in any
way.
In practice, we do not know the location of the adversarial
patch, so a more sophisticated defense is needed. Our ap-
∗Work done while Park was at the University of California, Berkeley.
Truck
(a) An attack image: a cat with a malicious 5× 5 sticker that causes
a standard model to classify it as a truck.
Truck Truck Truck Truck
Truck Truck Truck Truck
Truck Truck Bird Truck
Truck Truck Cat Cat
(b) We occlude part of the image with a grey square, then classify
these occluded images. Here the 3rd and 4th predictions in the 4th
row will be unaffected by this attack. Our actual defense ensures
that any attack will be fully occluded by a 3× 3 grid of predictions,
instead of the 1× 2 grid shown here.
Figure 1: Our scheme works by occluding different portions of
the image and analyzing the predictions made by the classifier
on these occluded images.
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Prediction and confidence:
Prediction labels and frequencies:
1 .98 7 .02
Full pred.: 1
True label: 1
(a) Benign
Prediction and confidence:
Prediction labels and frequencies:
2 .55 1 .24 7 .10 8 .07 4 .03
Full pred.: 2
True label: 1 Attack: visible, obscured
(b) Attack
Figure 2: Prediction grids for a benign image (left) and an
undefended attack image (right). Each cell in the grid is col-
ored based on the prediction made by the classifier when fed
an image obscured at that position in the grid. A cluster of
identical minority predictions, as seen in the right image, sug-
gests an attack. In the attack image on the right, green hashes
mark the nine predictions where the adversarial patch was
fully occluded.
proach works by occluding an area larger than the maximum
patch size and striding the occlude area across the image, mak-
ing an occluded prediction at each stride. We then analyze the
classifier’s predictions on these occluded images. If the oc-
clusion region is sufficiently larger than the adversarial patch,
several of the occluded images will completely obscure the
adversarial patch and thus the classifier’s prediction on those
images will be unaffected by the adversary and should match
the correct label. Thus, we expect the correct label to appear
multiple times among the predictions from occluded images.
We show how to use this redundancy to detect adversarial
patch attacks. We call our scheme the minority reports de-
fense because no matter where the patch is located, there will
always be a minority of predictions that cannot be influenced
by the attacker and vote for the correct label.
Figure 1 illustrates our defense. We take the input image
(Figure 1a) and construct a grid of partially occluded images
(Figure 1b) with occlusions at different locations, chosen so
that any attack will be occluded in a cluster of several predic-
tions. We then apply the classifier to each occluded image to
obtain a grid of predictions. When under attack, we can expect
most predictions to differ from the true label, but there will
always be a cluster of locations where the adversarial patch
is fully obscured and thus the labels are all expected to agree
with the true label; in Figure 1, the 3rd and 4th images in the
4th row obscure the adversarial patch and thus vote for the
true label. Our defense analyzes the grid of predicted labels
to detect this pattern. If there is a cluster of predictions that
all match each other but are in the minority for the prediction
grid overall, then this suggests an attack. Figure 2 visualizes
the prediction grid for a benign image (on the left) and a mali-
cious image containing an undefended adversarial patch (on
the right).1
We evaluate our scheme on the CIFAR-10 [KH09], Fash-
ion MNIST [XRV17], and MNIST [LBBH98] datasets with
a stride of one. We show that our defense does not harm ac-
curacy much. We also evaluate its security against adaptive
attacks. In particular, we show how to bound the success of
any possible attack on a given image, and using this we are
able to demonstrate certified security for a large fraction of
images. In particular, we are able to prove a security theorem:
for a large fraction of images in the validation set, we can
prove that no patch attack will succeed, no matter where the
patch is placed or how the patch is modified, so long as the
size of the patch is limited.
Our contributions are:
• We quantify the vulnerability of undefended networks
for Fashion MNIST and MNIST against patch attacks
with patches of different sizes (§3.2).
• We propose a novel method for detecting patch attacks,
based on differently occluded views of the input image
(§4).
• We provide a worst-case analysis of security against
adaptive attacks for CIFAR-10, Fashion MNIST, and
MNIST (§5 and §7).
2 Data and Inner Model Training
Our defense sends partially occluded images to an inner model,
which returns a normal logit prediction for the dataset classes.
For this inner model, we use a standard convolutional archi-
tecture, trained with data augmentation and random 90/10
train/validation splits: for CIFAR-10, we use SimpNet’s 600K
parameter version [HRF+18] trained for 700 epochs, though
we do not yet reproduce all details of their training; for Fash-
ion MNIST, a VGG-16 model [SZ14] trained for 50 epochs;
for MNIST, the Deotte model [Deo18] ([32C3-32C3-32C5S2]
- [64C3-64C3-64C5S2] - 128), with 40% dropout and batch
normalization and 45 epochs.
As our defense will partially occlude the image, we train
these inner models with occluded images. Each time an image
is presented in training, a randomly placed n × n square is
occluded and the model receives the occluded image. This
is similar to cutout from Devries et al. [DT17], who used oc-
clusion as a regularizer. We differ in that we also provide the
model an additional input containing a sparsity mask that indi-
cates which pixels are occluded. For instance, the input to the
CIFAR-10 model is an image, with dimensions 32×32×3, and
a mask, with dimensions 32×32×1. In the mask, a 0 indicates
an occluded position and a 1 indicates a non-occluded posi-
tion. To better handle the missing pixels, convolutions in the
inner model architecture are replaced with sparsity invariant
convolutions [USS+17]. If the mask indicates no occlusions,
1For the eagle eyed reader, our illustrations are still for a 6× 6 patch.
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the sparsity invariant convolutions behave as normal convolu-
tions; but, when occlusions are indicated, the occluded pixels
are handled better. We report inner model accuracies in §8.
3 Patch Attack
Patch attacks [BMR+17] work by replacing a small part of the
image with something of the attacker’s choosing, e.g., by plac-
ing a small sticker on an object or road sign. Figure 1a shows
a patch attack. Patch attacks represent a practical method of
executing an attack in the physical world. It is not uncommon
to see stickers on road signs in the real world, without prevent-
ing humans from understanding the signs nor prompting the
immediate removal of the patch. We see patch attacks partly
as a practical concern, and partly as a stepping stone toward
defending against full image attacks.
3.1 Attack model
We assume the attacker, with complete knowledge of the
model, may select a square area of limited size anywhere
within the digital image and arbitrarily modify all pixels within
that square to any values in the pixel range. For simplicity,
we restrict the attacker to a square patch. Our approach can
handle other shapes as well so long as they are known in
advance.
3.2 Patch sizes
We first studied how large a patch is needed to successfully
attack our models. We test multiple patch sizes and measure
the attacker’s success rate for each patch size.
Setup We conduct a targeted attack against our Fashion
MNIST and MNIST models from §2. We attack the first 300
validation images for Fashion MNIST and the first 100 vali-
dation images for MNIST, and report the fraction of images
for which we are able to successfully mount a patch attack.
For each image, we select a target label by choosing randomly
among the classes that are least likely, according to the soft-
max outputs of the classifier (namely, we find the least likely
class, identify all classes whose confidence is within 0.1% of
the least likely, and select the target class uniformly at ran-
dom among this set). That target is used for all attacks on that
image. For each base image and its chosen target class, we
enumerate all possible patch positions and try at each position
to find an attack patch at that position.
Attack algorithm To generate patch attacks, we iterate over
all possible locations for the patch, and use a projected gradi-
ent descent (PGD) attack for each location. We consider the
attack a success if we find any location where we can place a
patch that changes the model’s prediction to the target label.
The resulting adversarial patch is specific to one particular
image and one particular location.
The standard PGD attack uses a constant step size, but we
found it was more effective to use a schedule that varies the
step size among iterations. In our experiments, a cyclic learn-
ing rate was more effective than a constant step size or a
exponential decay rate, so we used it in all experiments. We
used a cyclic learning rate with 10 steps per cycle, with step
sizes from 0.002 to 0.3, for a maximum of 150 steps. We
stopped early at the end of a cycle if the attack achieved con-
fidence 0.6 or higher for the target class, or if the confidence
had not improved by at least 0.002 in the last 20 steps from
the best so far. For each image, we attacked in parallel across
all possible patch locations.
Results For our MNIST model, a 6×6 patch is large enough
to successfully attack 45% of the images. The success rate for
4× 4 patches was 19%, and for 8× 8 patches 80%. When an
image can be attacked, there are often many possible locations
where an adversarial patch can be placed: for a 6× 6 patch,
out of all images where a patch attack is possible, there were
on average of 41 different positions where the patch can be
placed.
For our Fashion MNIST model, the success rate for patch
attacks was as follows: 4× 4 patch: 27% success, 5× 5 patch:
50% success, 6× 6 patch: 60% success.
These results indicate that, on MNIST, an attacker needs
to control a 6 × 6 patch to have close to a 50% chance of
success, while a 5 × 5 patch is large enough for Fashion
MNIST, occupying 5% and 3% of the images respectively.
As recent work [CNA+20] focuses on 5 × 5 patches for
MNIST and CIFAR-10, we use 5× 5 patches for all datasets.
4 Our Defense
The basic idea of the minority reports defense is to occlude
part of the image and classify the resulting image. If the occlu-
sion completely covers the adversarial patch, then the attacker
will be unable to influence the classifier’s prediction. We
don’t know where the adversarial patch might be located, so
we stride the occlusion area across the image. Because we
use an occlusion area sufficiently larger than the adversarial
patch, no matter where the adversarial patch is placed there
should be a cluster of occlusion positions that all yield the
same prediction.
4.1 Creating a prediction grid
Our defense first generates a prediction grid, then analyzes it
for patterns that indicate an attack. We generate the prediction
grid as follows. For defending MNIST images against a 5× 5
adversarial patch, we use a 7× 7 occlusion region. We slide
the 7 × 7 occlusion region over the 28 × 28 image with a
stride of one pixel, yielding 22 × 22 possible locations for
the occlusion region. The prediction grid is a 22 × 22 array
that records, for each location, the classifier’s output. At each
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(a) Scattered minority predictions (b) Vote grid: benign
(c) Cluster of minority predictions (d) Vote grid: attack
Figure 3: In (a) and (c), we show the prediction grids for two
benign images. (b) and (d) show the corresponding vote grids.
We must decide if the minority votes (yellow) are benign er-
rors or what remains of the truth after an attack has influenced
the other predictions. Unanimous voting classifies the top
example as benign and the bottom as an attack.
location, we mask out the corresponding occlusion region of
the image, classify the occluded image, obtain the confidence
scores from the classifier’s softmax layer, and record that in
the corresponding cell of the prediction grid. Cell (i, j) of
the prediction grid contains the confidence scores for all 10
classes, when the pixels in the square (i, j), . . . , (i+ 7, j+ 7)
of the image are masked out.
We visualize the pattern of occlusions in Figure 1b, though
with a large stride for illustration. A stride of one on MNIST
produces prediction grids such as figure 2 and figures 3a
and 3c.
If the image contains an adversarial patch centered at loca-
tion (i, j), then obscuring at each of the 9 locations centered
at (i− 1, j − 1), . . . , (i+ 1, j + 1) yields nine images where
the adversarial patch has been completely overwritten, and the
predictions in those cells of the prediction grid are completely
unaffected by the attacker. If the classifier is sufficiently ac-
curate on occluded images, we can hope that all of those 9
predictions match the true label. Thus, within the prediction
grid, we can expect to see a 3×3 region where the predictions
are uninfluenced by the attacker and (hopefully) all agree with
each other. Our defense takes advantage of this fact.
4.2 Detection
In a benign image, typically every cell in the prediction grid
predicts for the same label. In contrast, in a malicious image,
we expect there will be a 3× 3 region in the prediction grid
(where the adversarial patch is obscured) that predicts a single
label, and some or all of the rest of the prediction grid will
have a different prediction. We use this to detect attacks.
In our simplest defense, we look at all 3 × 3 regions in
the prediction grid that vote unanimously for the same label
(i.e., all 9 cells yield the same classification). If there are two
different labels that both have a 3× 3 unanimous vote, then
we raise an alarm and treat this as a malicious image.
Equivalently, we categorize each 3 × 3 region within the
prediction grid as either unanimously voting for a class (if all
9 cells in that region vote for that class) or abstaining (if they
don’t all agree). We construct a 20× 20 voting grid recording
these votes. If the voting grid consists of solely a single class
and abstentions, then we treat the image as benign, and we
use that class as the final prediction of our scheme. Otherwise,
if the voting grid contains more than one class, we treat it as
malicious.
The idea behind this defense is twofold. First, in a benign
image, we expect it to be rare for any 3 × 3 region in the
prediction grid to vote unanimously for an incorrect class:
that would require the classifier to be consistently wrong on 9
occluded images. Therefore, the voting grid for benign images
will likely contain only the correct class and abstentions. Sec-
ond, for a malicious image, no matter where the adversarial
patch is placed, there will be a 3 × 3 region in the predic-
tion grid that is uninfluenced by the attack and thus can be
expected to vote unanimously for the true class. This means
that the voting grid for malicious images will likely contain
the correct class at least once. This places the attacker in an
impossible bind: if the attack causes any other class to appear
in the voting grid, the attack will be detected; but if it does
not, then our scheme will classify the image correctly. Either
way, the defender wins.
We can formulate our defense mathematically as follows.
Let x denote an image, mi,j denote the mask that occludes
pixels in [i, i+ 7]× [j, j + 7], and xmi,j denote the result
of masking image x with mask mi,j . Then the prediction grid
p is constructed as
pi,j = C(xmi,j ,mi,j), (1)
where the classifier C outputs a vector of confidence scores.
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The voting grid is defined as
vi,j =
{
c if c = arg maxc′ pi+u,j+v,c′ ∀u, v ∈ {0, 1, 2}
otherwise.
(2)
If there exists a single class c such that vi,j = c or vi,j =
for all i, j, then our scheme treats the image as benign and
outputs the class c; otherwise, our scheme treats the image as
malicious.
We illustrate how the defense works with two examples.
For instance, if the prediction grid is as shown in figure 3a
then it yields the voting grid in figure 3b. This will be treated
as benign, with classification 7. We show another example of
a prediction grid in figure 3c and the resulting voting grid in
figure 3d. This image will be treated as malicious, and our
scheme will decline to classify it. In particular, it is possible
that the true label is 5, but an adversarial patch was placed
in the upper-left that caused most of the classifications to be
shifted to 3, except for a few cases where the patch was partly
or wholly obscured. It is of course also possible that the image
was benign and a cluster of classification errors caused this
pattern, which is the case here.
4.3 Visualization
To give some intuition, we visualize a few sample prediction
grids in figure 4. The 22× 22 prediction grid is displayed as
a Hinton diagram with 22 × 22 squares. The color of each
square indicates which class had highest confidence at that
location in the prediction grid (i.e., the class predicted by
the classifier). The size of each square is proportional to the
confidence of that class.
We show a representative example from each of four differ-
ent common cases that we have seen:
(a) Most benign images have a prediction grid that predicts
all for the same label or has just scattered minority pre-
dictions and looks like case (a): the predictions almost
always agree with the true label, for almost all positions
of the occlusion region, but there are a few locations
that when occluded cause classification errors (non-black
squares). These will be correctly classified and treated
as benign by our scheme.
(b) A few benign images have prediction grids that are more
noisy and contain large clusters of incorrect predictions
in the prediction grid. These will be (incorrectly) catego-
rized as malicious by our scheme, i.e., they will cause a
false positive.
(c) We show the prediction grid resulting from a typical
attack image, with a adversarial patch placed near the
center of the image. The green cross-hatching represents
the locations that completely occlude the adversarial
patch. Those locations in the prediction grid, as well as
Prediction and confidence:
Prediction labels and frequencies:
1 .98 7 .02
Full pred.: 1
True label: 1
(a) Benign: representative
Prediction and confidence:
Prediction labels and frequencies:
8 .76 9 .14 4 .07 2 .03
Full pred.: 8 9
True label: 8
(b) Benign: uncommon
Prediction and confidence:
Prediction labels and frequencies:
2 .55 1 .24 7 .10 8 .07 4 .03
Full pred.: 2
True label: 1 Attack: visible, obscured
(c) Attack
Prediction and confidence:
Prediction labels and frequencies:
3 .53 2 .28 8 .14 6 .05
Full pred.: 3
True label: 2 Attack: visible, obscured
(d) Attack
Figure 4: Representative prediction grids for benign and un-
defended attack MNIST images. Color indicates the arg max
label for that occlusion position and confidence is indicated
by how much of the square is filled. We show at the bot-
tom of each figure a legend indicating which class each color
corresponds to and its frequency in the prediction grid; we
also show the top prediction and confidence if no pixels are
occluded. For attack images, green hashes show the 3 × 3
grid of predictions that completely occlude the attack, red
hashes show the predictions that do not occlude the attack at
all. The hashes are not part of our defense, merely an aid for
the reader. (The short orange bars are from a detection method
that compares with the non-occluded prediction.)
some other locations in a broader ring around this, vote
unanimously for the true label (1). Occlusion regions
placed elsewhere fail to occlude the adversarial patch
and cause the classifier to mis-classify the image as the
attacker’s target class (2). Our scheme correctly recog-
nizes this as malicious, because the voting grid contains
both unanimous votes for 1 and for 2.
(d) Other attack images have even more noise outside the
fully occluded area. These too are correctly recognized
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as malicious, because the voting grid contains unanimous
votes for multiple labels, here 3, 2, and 6.
4.4 The full minority reports defense
We found that the above defense can be improved by incor-
porating two refinements: (a) using soft agreement instead of
hard unanimity, and (b) tolerating outliers.
First, instead of checking whether a 3× 3 region in the pre-
diction grid votes unanimously for the same label, we check
whether the confidence for that label, averaged over the region,
exceeds some threshold. For instance, with a 90% threshold,
if the confidence scores for class c within that 3 × 3 region
average to 0.9 or larger, then we’d record a vote for c in the
voting grid; if no class exceeds the threshold, then we record
an abstention.
Second, when computing the average, we discard the lowest
score before computing the average. This allows us to tolerate
a single outlier when checking for agreement in a 3×3 region.
Mathematically, we fix a threshold τ , and then form the
voting grid as
vi,j =
{
c if avg({pi+u,j+v,c ∀u, v ∈ {0, 1, 2}}) ≥ τ
otherwise.
(3)
Here we define avg(S) to be the average of S \ {minS}, i.e.,
the average of all but the lowest score in the multiset S.
The threshold τ is a hyper-parameter that can be used to
control the trade-off between false positives and false neg-
atives. Increasing τ reduces the number of false positives,
but also risks failing to detect some attacks; decreasing τ in-
creases detection power, at the cost of increasing the false
positive rate.
The size of the occlusion region is another hyper-parameter
of our defense. In our experiments, we always chose an occlu-
sion region that is two pixels larger than the largest adversarial
patch we seek to defend. Thus our occlusion region will be
7 × 7 and we provide certified results against adversarial
patches up to 5 × 5 in size. Our approach can generalize to
other shapes, such as rectangles or even to arbitrary shapes, so
long as they are known in advance. We can defend against a
rectangular w×h sticker, with a (w+ 2)× (h+ 2) occlusion
region. To defend against stickers with some other known
shape S, the occlusion region can be obtained as the union of
9 translations of S, where we translate independently by −1,
0, or 1 pixels in each dimension.
We visualize the operation of our final defense in figure 5.
5 Security Evaluation
One benefit of our design is that it enables us to guarantee
the security of our scheme on some images. We describe our
certified security analysis in this section.
(a) Cluster of minority predictions (b) Vote grid: benign
Figure 5: Our full defense on the benign prediction grid from
figure 3c, with τ = 0.9 classifying as benign (b). A sticker un-
der any of the non voting areas would be undetected. A sticker
in the lower right, when occluded, would leave in (a) the con-
fident remains of the original prediction, and be classified as
an attack.
The core observation is: if the adversarial patch is com-
pletely occluded, then the adversary cannot have any influence
on the prediction made by the classifier on the correspond-
ing occluded image. For certified security, we make a very
conservative assumption: we assume that the adversary might
be able to completely control the classifier’s prediction for
all other occluded images (i.e., where the patch is only partly
occluded, or is not occluded at all). This assumption lets us
make a worst-case analysis of whether the classification a par-
ticular image could change in the presence of an adversarial
patch of a particular size.
Notice that wherever the sticker is placed, there will be a
3×3 grid in the prediction grid that is unaffected by the sticker.
(This is because with a stride of one we use an occlusion re-
gion that is 2 pixels larger than the maximum possible sticker
size.) It follows that there will be some cell in the voting grid
that is not changed by the sticker.
If the voting grid for an image x is completely filled with
votes for a single class c, with no abstentions, then any image
x′ that differs by introduction of a single sticker will either
be classified by our defense as class c or will be detected by
our defense as malicious. (This follows because at least one
element of the voting grid is unaffected by the sticker, so at
least one element of the voting grid for x′ will vote for c. If
no other class appears in the voting grid, then our defense
will classify x′ as class c; if some other class appears, then
our defense will treat x′ as malicious.) Thus, such images
can be certified safe—there is no way to attack them without
being detected. If the prediction is also correct, we classify
the image as certified accurate.
In contrast, if the voting grid has even one region that does
not vote, or votes as the attacker would like, then our conser-
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vative analysis is forced to assume that it might be possible
to attack the image: the attacker can place a sticker at that
location, potentially changing all the other regions’ votes, and
thereby escape detection.
We evaluate the security of our scheme by measuring the
fraction of images that can be certified safe and certified accu-
rate, according to the conservative analysis above.
6 Higher Resolution Images
For higher resolution images, a stride of one pixel becomes
prohibitive. Increasing the stride lets us manage the cost. For
a patch of size p× p pixels and a stride of s pixels, an occlude
area of (p + 2s) × (p + 2s) produces nine full occlusions
of any patch, if the patch is aligned to our stride grid. This
mirrors what we have done with a stride of one. To account for
patches not aligned to our stride grid, we increase our occlude
by one stride. Thus our occlude area is (p + 3s) × (p + 3s)
pixels for a stride of s, for s > 1.
As an example, if CIFAR-10 had twice the resolution, our
5×5 pixel patch would be 10×10 pixels. With a stride of two,
our occlude area would be 16×16, or (10+3×2)×(10+3×2).
7 Experiments
We evaluate the effectiveness of our defense by measuring
the clean accuracy (the images that when unmodified are
classified correctly by class and as benign) and the certified
accuracy (the images that when unmodified are classified cor-
rectly by class and as benign and where any attack – targeted
or un-targeted – will either not change the classification or
will be detected).
Method We measure the clean and the certified accuracy
on the 5000 or 6000 validation images. We perform multiple
trials, using a different random 90/10 train/validation split
for each trial. For each dataset we perform n = 4 trials. The
standard deviation is relatively low (for clean and certified
accuracy they are CIFAR-10: 0.2 – 0.8% 0.5 – 1.1%, Fashion
MNIST: 0.2–0.4% 0.2–0.6%, MNIST: 0.0 – 0.1% 0.1–0.5%).
We report results for different points in the tradeoff between
clean and certified accuracy, and compare with recent related
work using Interval Bounds Propagation (IBP) [CNA+20].
Results Our results, table 1, show that our defense achieves
relatively high clean and certified accuracy and outperforms
the previous state of the art.
For CIFAR-10, we achieve a clean accuracy of 92.4% and
43.8% of images can be certified accurate (no matter where a
sticker is placed, the resulting image will either be classified
correctly or the attack will be detected) for 5 × 5 stickers.
This is significantly better than recent work by Chiang et al.
[CNA+20], which achieves clean accuracy of 47.8% and cer-
tified accuracy of 30.3% for CIFAR-10 against 5× 5 stickers.
Table 1: The clean accuracy and certified accuracy of our
defense (MR) vs the previous state of the art (IBP) on all three
datasets, for a 5× 5 adversarial patch. We report the literature
reported accuracy of our inner model architectures in the third
column. We report the accuracy our inner model achieves on
non-occluded clean images in the fourth column.
Accuracy
Dataset Defense Lit. Inner Clean Cert.
CIFAR-10 IBP [CNA+20] 47.8% 30.3%
MR (Our) 94.0% 92.5% 78.8% 77.6%
90.6% 62.1%
92.4% 43.8%
Fashion MR 93.8% 85.4% 84.3%
93.0% 69.4%
93.9% 42.0%
MNIST IBP [CNA+20] 92.9% 62.0%
MR 99.6% 99.6% 95.1% 94.9%
99.0% 75.8%
99.4% 64.2%
For MNIST, we achieve a clean accuracy of 99.4% and
64.2% of images can be certified accurate for 5× 5 stickers.
This is again significantly better than recent work [CNA+20]:
the error rate on clean images is more than an order of magni-
tude lower, and the certified accuracy is slightly higher.
Our measurement of certified accuracy is based on con-
servative assumptions. We suspect that many images that we
cannot certify accurate are in fact secure against attack, even
though we cannot prove it. Thus, the number certified accurate
represents a conservative lower bound on the true robustness
of our scheme.
Discussion Our experiments show that by choosing a high
τ , we can achieve clean accuracy that is very close to the
accuracy of our inner model on non-occluded images. With a
lower τ we can achieve a higher certified accuracy at the cost
of a lower clean accuracy.
For CIFAR-10, the architecture we used is reported to have
an accuracy of 94.0% when trained appropriately. We did
not replicate all aspects of the authors’ training procedure,
and achieved only 92.5%. Once we replicate their full train-
ing procedure, we expect our CIFAR-10 results would also
improve.
We did an ablation study where we omitted the occlude
training, and found that the occlude training is essential: With-
out it, the defense is extremely ineffective.
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8 Effects of Occlude Training
Our defense requires the inner model to handle occluded im-
ages well. To assess the effect of this requirement, we trained
models with and without occlusions for all three inner-model
architectures.
Training on occluded images appears to have only a small
change on the accuracy of the inner model on non-occluded
images, see table 2. The change is at worst the standard devi-
ation of our measurements. Note from table 1 that the clean
accuracy of our defense might have either a small or no drop
from the accuracy of our inner-model.
Table 2: The effect of training on occluded images, on the
inner model’s accuracy on non-occluded images. We show the
difference (last column) and the standard deviation (n = 4).
Type of training images
Dataset Non-occluded Occluded ∆
CIFAR-10 92.5± 0.3% 92.5± 0.2% −0.0%
Fashion 94.1± 0.4% 93.8± 0.3% −0.3%
MNIST 99.58± 0.08% 99.63± 0.33% +0.05%
Note that this does not measure the accuracy of our defense
as a whole. Our defense feeds the inner model occluded im-
ages at test time, and accuracy on occluded images is slightly
lower than on non-occluded images.
9 Related Work
In earlier work, Hayes proposes a defense against sticker at-
tacks using inpainting of a suspected sticker region to remove
the sticker from the image [Hay18]. This is similar to our
defense. However, Hayes uses a heuristic to identify the re-
gion to inpaint (based on unusually dense regions within the
saliency map), so any attack that fools the heuristic could de-
feat their defense. One could use inpainting in our scheme
instead of occlusion, and it is possible this might improve
accuracy, though our work can be viewed as showing that
simple occlusion suffices to get strong results. Naseer et al.
propose a defense against sticker attacks by smoothing high
frequency image details to remove the sticker [NKP18]. They
limit accuracy loss by using windows that overlap by a third,
but their windows are smaller than the attack patch. Chiang
et al. broke both of these defenses [CNA+20], so neither is
effective against adaptive attacks; in contrast, we guarantee
security against adaptive attack.
In concurrent work, Wu et al. defend against adversarial
patches with adversarial training [WTV20]. The primary ad-
vantage of our approach is that it provides certified security.
In concurrent work, Chiang et al. study certified secu-
rity against patch attacks using interval bounds propagation
[CNA+20]. As discussed above, our defense achieves signifi-
cantly better certified accuracy on both MNIST and CIFAR
than their scheme. They also examine how their defense gen-
eralizes to other shapes of stickers and how to achieve security
against L0-bounded attacks, topics that we have not examined.
10 Conclusion
We propose the minority reports defense, a network architec-
ture designed specially to be robust against patch attacks. We
show experimentally that it is successful at defending against
these attacks for a significant fraction of images.
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